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Abstract 
This study examines the role of traditional rulers in the Nigerian electoral process with a view to 
revealing perceptions arising from such engagement, specifically in democratic transitional process. 
The study also explores opinions of selected traditional ruler ship councils. It adopts a 
structural-functionalism approach and qualitative method of data analysis. Thus, the paper argues that 
there are various controversies surrounding the institution of the traditional rulers in Nigeria showing 
mix of conspiracy, corruption, dictatorship, and disrespect for the rule of law with incumbent political 
leaders; which suggests that such alignment indices by some traditional rulers are borrowed from 
modern democratic leaders. Thus, study concludes that the continuous contributions of the traditional 
rulers in electoral process will further guarantee their relevance in modern democratic governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional institutions have gone through good and bad times in the country’s political history right 
from the pre-colonial, through the colonial and even up till the post-colonial periods; and have not 
relented in their commitment to the democratic process in Africa generally, and Nigeria, particularly. 
However, the relevance of traditional ruler ship institution in African contemporary politics has 
generated rancorous debates (Tonwe & Osemwota, 2013; Agbese, 2004; Vaughan, 1991). Traditional 
ruler ship has been a primordial and sacrosanct institution existing before the advent of colonialism in 
Africa. This indigenous structure appears in different forms as well as in their changing roles from 
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pre-colonization to the present date in Africa (Ihemeje, 2014; Tonwe & Osemwota, 2013). Traditional 
institutions are indispensable for political transformation in Africa, as they represent a major part of the 
continent’s history, culture, and governance systems. This view attributes the ineffectiveness of the 
African State in bringing about sustained socio-economic development due to its neglect of traditional 
institutions and its failure to restore Africa’s own history (Basil Davidson, 1992, cited in Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2004). 
In political reality, traditional rulers cannot be deserted in stabilizing democratic governance in Nigeria, 
their roles in electoral sensitization, citizenship education and assurance of security of lives and 
properties cannot be misjudged. Conversely, the muddling up of traditional rulership with modernity, 
human rituality, and corruption has hi-cupped the structural legality of this indigenous institution which 
is considered as repulsive to global democratic political folklore. Surprisingly, traditional rulership 
institution has compromised the tenet of many African traditions where selection of the consecrated 
position of traditional rulership becomes a commercial vehicle for the highest bidders. Today, this issue 
has generated vacillating arguments among the scholars about the potentiality and structural qualities of 
this indigenous institution toward sustainable democracy in Nigeria (Vanghan, 1991; Agbese, 2004; 
Ofuafor & Amusa, 2012; Ihemeje, 2014). 
It was not until the British colonial officials began to realize that colonial success depended greatly on 
the recognition and involvement of the traditional rulers that they began to patronize and incorporate 
them into the Indirect Rule system. This realization was not unconnected with the fact that the 
Europeans discovered that Nigerians were so bound with their traditions and traditional rulers to the 
extent that whatever they ordered was what the people would do or not do as the case may be. This was 
the origin of the involvement of the involvement of traditional rulers in colonial government which has 
received great criticisms from scholars as “criminality” (Emordi & Osiki, 2008, cited in Amusa & 
Ofuafor, 2012). 
Contemporarily, traditional rulers have a great influence in election and electioneering processes in 
Nigerian democratic politics. The recent observations justify their significant role in electoral 
engagement. This usually comes inform of paying homage/visiting the traditional rulers during election 
campaign by the various political contestants; therefore, their roles in the functional electoral processes 
become a remarkable theme in Nigerian body politics. A very good example is traceable to the visit 
made by the Presidents of Federal Republic of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan and MuhammaduBuhari to 
palaces of all first class traditional rulers in Nigeria, including Alaafin of Oyo, Ooni of Ife, Olubadan of 
Ibadan, Oba of Lagos, Emir of Kano, Obi of Onisha just to mention a few, signaling the mammoth 
recognition of traditional rulers in the optimum realization of 2011 and 2015 general elections 
respectively in Nigeria. It is believed that traditional rulers are capable of mobilizing, coordinating, and 
swaying the choice of the citizens during the election. 
There are more “traditional” rulers today than at Independence in 1960. Politicians try to win votes by 
promising to upgrade chieftaincies or create new ones. Clearly, such rulers continue to strike a chord in 
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the twenty-first century, when power is diffused and chaotic. One reason for this is that traditional 
rulers are often more trusted than local and state government officials during post-conflict situations, 
which are becoming extremely common (Blench et al., 2006; Ochonu, 2010; Daily Independent 
Newspaper, 2014). Where true traditional chieftaincy institutions exist, government of those countries 
have willingly or reluctantly accepted, knowingly or unknowingly, that the surest way to win the hearts 
of the people on major issues of the day has been through the traditional rulers (Sunday Trust 
Newspaper, 2011). 
The institution of traditional rulers is an enduring part of our heritage. It plays a critical role as the 
custodian of culture and traditions. Expectedly, our traditional rulers are closely linked with the 
grassroots, and so understand the problems of our people intimately. In our search for peace, order and 
stability in our society, the institution could be a veritable instrument. It is in the overall interest of our 
people that this institution in our national life be acknowledged and that clear provisions are made (in 
the constitution) for its effective functioning (Agbese, 2004; Ihemeje, 2014; The Pointer Newspaper, 
2014).  
The traditional institutions in Nigeria, particularly the traditional rulership has remained a strong 
political force to reckon with in the contemporary Nigerian politics in spite of their official and 
constitutional relegation to the background. This has been made possible by the magnitude of the 
power and resilience of African traditions and spiritualties which have continued to have great 
influence in the lives and activities of the Africans (Amusa & Ofuafor, 2012).  
Therefore, this study is driven by the need to elucidate the relevance of the traditional rulers’ 
involvement in democratic elections and transition process in deepening democratic governance 
through the lens of qualitative analysis. The study seeks to establish the roles and contributions of the 
traditional rulers in the electoral process that ascertains their continuous existence and relationship with 
modern governance within the purview of Nigerian political culture. The paper is divided into four 
parts with the first part introducing the thrust of the paper. 
 
2. Method 
This article is both explorative and contextual, that is qualitative in nature. In its presentation, it 
attempts to demystify the discourse with relevant theoretical framework, result/findings, discussion and 
conclusions that are largely derived from extant literature and field survey on the subject matter. 
2.1 Traditional Ruler, Traditional Institution, Election and Electoral Process 
This section deals with the discourses of concepts as the foundation of its analysis, review of 
literatureand juxtaposition with a theoretical approach (Akindele et al., 2012, p. 175; Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 891).  
Despite the egregious misconception about traditional rulership institution which has created a great 
vacuum in defining what traditional rulership institution should presage, many scholars have been 
unable to bifurcate diversity inherent from traditional institutional structure as a multi-faceted concept. 
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However, traditional institution is all encompassing, it constitutes various indigenous institutions which 
may include traditional festival; the kingship institution, sacerdotal society, age-grade, demi-gods, 
indigenous financial institution (esusu), etc. Therefore, for the purpose of this work, traditional ruler as 
a component of traditional institution assigned with certain responsibilities is defined within the context 
of African political system. 
Traditional authorities are the leaders of traditional communities. The word “traditional” refers to 
historic roots of leadership, which legitimizes the execution of power. There are many existing forms of 
traditional leadership. In Europe, the rule of kings and nobles was the dominant governing force for a 
long time until it was gradually replaced by democratic structures. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
traditional authorities are mostly referred to as chiefs and elders (Lutz & Linder, 2004). The National 
Conference of Traditional Rulers defines a traditional ruler as the person who by virtue of his ancestry 
occupies the throne or stool of an area and who has been appointed to it in accordance with the customs 
and traditions of the area and whose throne has been in existence before the advent of the British in 
Nigeria. The area over which he and his forefathers have ruled or reigned must have at least been 
created by a Native Authority in 1910 or the date of the introduction of the Native Authority to the area 
concerned. In the case of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria for example, traditional stools are 
established according to the customs and traditions of the people and recognized by the Governments 
in those areas and occupied date of this resolution will not by virtue of this definitions be disqualified, 
provided also that in respect of other parts of the Federation of Nigeria, traditional stools similarly 
established prior to the 1st of October 1979, will not by virtue of this definition be disqualified (Agbese, 
2004).  
A “traditional ruler” may be defined as the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the 
holderof the highest primary executive authority in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to 
such position in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order 
of the state government, and whose title is recognized as a traditional ruler title holder by the 
Government of the State (Ola & Tonwe, 2009, p. 174; Tonwe & Osemwota, 2013). 
Traditional ruler refers to a person conferred with indigenous, cultural, and customary-based authority; 
and whose reign of a monarchy is the accepted controller of the people in their affairs of life. It means a 
unanimously elected or selected person by a given community to pilot the affairs of his people in line 
with customs and traditions of the community (Yol, 2010). Traditional rulership institution implies 
primordial or existing structure designed to rule over the indigenous communities/locales within the 
range of set norms. This institution derives its power from long established tradition and custom which 
serves as precedence of the communal behaviors. Traditional ruler precisely rules over the indigenous 
citizens with specific assigned roles and functions similar to that of government in the modern society. 
According to the MartinézCobo Report to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination of Minorities (1986), indigenous peoples may be identified as follows:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with 
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pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct 
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence 
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (cited in 
Lutz & Linder, 2004). 
By traditional institution, it refers to the indigenous political arrangements whereby leaders with proven 
track records are appointed and installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs 
(Orji & Olali, 2010, p. 402, cited in Nweke, 2012). The essence of the institutions is to preserve the 
customs and traditions of the people and to manage conflicts arising among or between members of the 
community by the instrumentality of laws and customs of the people (Nweke, 2012). 
Miles (1993) identified five modern functions of traditional rulers which include linkages or brokering 
between grassroots and capital; extension of national identity through the conferral of traditional titles; 
low level conflict resolution and judicial gate-keeping; ombudsman ship and institutional safety value 
for overloaded and sub-apportioned bureaucracies. 
Any account of social institutions must begin by informally marking off social institutions from other 
social forms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011). An institution is any structure or mechanism 
or social order governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given community; may it be 
human or a specific animal one. Institutions are identified with social purpose, transcending individuals 
and intentions by mediating the rules that govern living behavior. The term “institution” is commonly 
applied to custom and behavior patterns important to a society, as well as to particular formal 
organization or government and public services (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/institution). As it relates to 
traditional structure, the essence of the institutions is to preserve the customs and traditions of the 
people and to manage conflicts arising among or between members of the community by the 
instrumentality of laws and customs of the people (Nweke, 2012). 
Election may be defined as an act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of 
persons, things, courses, or rights (Black’s Law Dictionary). It is a formal process of selecting a person 
for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting (Encyclopedia Britannica). 
Election constitutes major activities in pre-election, election and post-election process, these may 
include voter’s registration, registration of political party, election campaign, voting guidelines, voting, 
counting of votes, pronouncement of election results and ventilation of anger against election results at 
the court of law for proper adjudication. Therefore, election connotes the overall management of 
electoral processes in a political system.  
Elections are central to competitive politics. They are central because, ideally, they should provide the 
opportunity for yesterday’s winners to become today’s losers, and for yesterday’s losers to become 
today’s winners. The model of democracy on which this theory of elections is based is liberal 
democratic. The centrality of elections to liberal democratic politics also presupposes the importance 
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particularly of impartial electoral administration. This is because the indeterminacy of elections the 
possibility of erstwhile winners becoming losers and erstwhile losers becoming winners-which is an 
inherent and necessary prerequisite of liberal democratic politics is to a large extent a function of an 
impartial administration of elections (Jinadu, 1997, p. 1, cited in Ojo, 2012). 
In Nigeria, the set of actions put in place for the management of electoral exercise has been driven by 
many actors, traditional rulers inclusive. The fundamental role of this rulership institution remains 
significant in any democratic activity. In view of IDEA (2010), the electoral process comprises of eight 
segments: legal framework, planning & implementation, training and education, voter registration, 
electoral campaign, voting operation, verification of results and post-election. However, it can be 
rightly observed that the involvement of traditional rulers in some of these stated segments become 
noteworthy owing to their acceptability, responsiveness and practicable input and outputs in 
governance since the amalgamation till date.  
The review clearly indicates that a lot has been done in the aspect of history, roles and challenges of 
traditional rulers while lacuna on the relevance of traditional rulers in electoral process remains 
uncovered, hence the significance of this paper. 
2.1.1 Structural Functionalism: A Theoretical Approach 
Structural functionalism theory is adopted in this study to establish the traditional rulership institution 
as functional organ within the nucleus of Nigerian society. The relevant contributions of eminent 
sociologists such as August Comte, Herbert Spencer (organic structure) and Emile Durkheim provide a 
great insight into functional society. Structural functionalism views society as interconnected objects 
designed to form a whole part. The various organizations in the society are incorporated to assist each 
other in order to form a holistic system which works together to achieve a common goal. According to 
Yol (2010), he argues that functionalism ensures that all societies share the same norms and values 
while these norms and values are embodied in the law; and that the social order comprises of the 
internalization of these norms and values through the roles performed by traditional rulers in their 
communities. 
Durkheim attempts to explain the new relationship patterns he observed by theorizing the concept of 
solidarity. In “division of labour”, Durkheim suggests that smaller communities are linked by tradition 
and personal relationships. However, as urbanization occurs, a society experiences a denser form of 
integration and differentiation and, consequently, individuals must adopt more specialized roles in 
order complement each other. Durkheim describes the former as mechanical solidarity while the latter 
is considered as organic. Under these circumstances, the subsequent interaction causes another social 
phenomenon to emerge; one that is distinct from individuals and has a life of its own. He describes this 
phenomenon as “social facts” or “institutions” (these are norms, beliefs, morals, etc.). According to 
Durkheim, social integration depends on the proper maintenance of this system of values as well as the 
extent to which they are commonly shared, by what he refers to as the “collective conscience” 
(Durkheim & Halls, 1984, cited in Harper, 2011). Chiefs and kings have for centuries been custodians 
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of Africa/s culture and heritage. They have also been a symbol of the people’s voice. However, they 
have authority over traditional laws and customs, and chiefs have a great deal of influence in the 
community (BBC News Friday, 2004). Therefore, traditional rulership institution becomes crucial 
element in the functional society; it regulates, normalizes, contributes and partakes in the societal 
activities, thus seen as viable instrument in Nigerian electoral processes because its roles are 
immeasurable in the peaceful political conducts in the society. Tonwe and Osemwota (2013) observed 
that the traditional ruler formed the nucleus of governance. One striking fact is that the geographical 
spheres of authority of these traditional rulers are essentially localized and no traditional ruler ever had 
jurisdiction over the entire geographical area of modern Nigeria. Similarly, Erero (2005) posits that 
given the considerable diversity and cultural heterogeneity of Nigerian society, any generalizations on 
traditional structures of government would be pretentious. 
In the foregoing, it is evident that traditional rulers are recognized as one of the significant social 
institutions which regulate the functionality of African political system. Their role is very crucial in the 
sustenance of democratic governance as it reflects in colonial regime as a viable instrument for the 
realization of general administration of government in Nigeria. 
2.1.2 Traditional Rulers and the Nigerian Electoral Process: Gain or Pain 
This section evaluates the views of scholars, tagged, “traditional rulers and the Nigerian electoral 
process: gain or pain”, and responses from field survey systematically complement the analysis. 
The survey data comprised careful use of responses from select traditional rulers’ councils in Anambra, 
Edo, Oyo and Kwara States; drawn from South-east, South-south, South-west and North-central 
geopolitical zones of Nigeria between 2012 and 2013. The data were purposively selected since 
elections were conducted in those zones that engaged the services of traditional rulers in terms of 
consultation, political meetings/courtesy calls, blessing, advice, and importantly, voters’ education. The 
analysis covers aspects of structural functionalism that are tied to electoral process where traditional 
rulers were actively involved as well as their subjects. 
Historically, African traditional institutions of governance are diverse. They have evolved significantly 
from their pre-colonial forms in tandem with transformation of the continent’s political systems, during 
the colonial and post-colonial eras. Despite their complex diversity, much of the post-independence 
literature classifies African traditional institutions of governance into two types, based on their 
pre-colonial forms: (a) the consensus-based systems of the decentralized pre-colonial political systems; 
and (b) chieftaincy of the centralized political systems (Economic Commission for Africa, 2010). The 
intrusion of colonialism dismantled the structures of traditional absolutism in virtually all the 
indigenous ethnic nationalities of the South-South zone in the Nigeria. The use of gunboat diplomacy 
and brute force, cowered these paramount rulers into submission in the face of a more sophisticated 
weaponry and tactics of the West (Orji, 2013). 
The Lyttelton constitution 1954 (revised in 1957) greatly reduced the constitutional powers of the 
traditional rulers both at the centre and in the regions. At the federal level, the legislature was divided 
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into two Houses: The Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate was composed of 12 
representatives appointed by the Governors of the regions. The Governor-General also appointed two 
representatives for Lagos while the Chiefs of Lagos elected one. The Oba of Lagos was automatically a 
member. The House of Representatives consisted of 320 members who were directly elected, for the 
first time; the House of Chiefs played no role in this process. Members of the House of Chiefs were not 
allowed to be members of the Senate, nor member of any regional legislature (Fajonyomi, n.d.). 
Observably, the gradual relegation of constitutional powers of the kings set in after this period.  
A review of extant literatures on traditional rulership institutions revealed the rationale behind their 
institutional demotion, which includes: self-inflicted (partisanship in politics, defecation of traditional 
values, lack of integrity by some, money-for-chieftaincy policies, in-fighting; military dictatorship 
(clipping of wings and enthronement of subservient culture); social malaise (moral decay in the society, 
lack of respect for elders and constituted authority—including traditional institutions); dwindling 
sphere of influence and breaking down of the “kingdom” overseen by the traditional rulers); conflict of 
interest and authority between local government authorities and traditional rulers; globalization 
(waning influence and interest in monarchies, and traditional institutions worldwide); politics (party 
politics have been played in a manner to undermine the influence of traditional rulers over local voters); 
the economy (begging for financial support from subjects); abuse of privilege, such as giving 
chieftaincy titles and honors to less deserving members of the society has created a society with false 
values, and negative role models (Fayonjomi, n.d.). 
Correspondingly and as noted earlier, immediately after independence, the powers and authority of the 
traditional institutions declined as their continuous existence depended on the whims and caprices of 
the Nigerian government. During this new period, the closeness between the traditional institutions and 
the political class affected the institutions so much. The integration of traditional and modern politics 
helped to retain and reformulate traditional and state’s politics in the newly independent Nigerian States. 
It has been argued that successful military regimes in Nigeria from 1966 relied on traditional 
institutions for their legitimacy, thereby further politicizing the institutions. More traditional rulers were 
appointed depending on those they supported in power. With time and due to personal aggrandizement, 
traditional institutions diminished over time in the usual sovereignty over their people. Others who 
were not loyal, so to say, were removed or suspended (Omotosho, 2010, cited in Nweke, 2012). 
Concurrently, there are other obstacles confronting the indigenous structure of traditional rulers as it is 
premised in constitutional lacuna, this was corroborated in Nigerian Daily that: 
The constitution has no direct role for traditional rulers. This lacuna has led to a groundswell of calls 
from monarchs and traditionalists for a direct constitutional function for our royal fathers. This is how 
it should be in a republic. And really, in many places, our people still rely upon and trust their 
traditional rulers in making choices on politics, economic activities, education and taking social action. 
This is an invaluable social capital that any politician will give just anything to have (Daily 
Independent Newspaper, 2014). 
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Within a constitutional context, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions created a Council of Chiefs for them in 
the regions and some of them were even regional governors. The 1979 Constitution gave them 
representation in the National Council of State. The current 1999 Constitution did not even mention the 
traditional institution. Is this not enough indicator of their plight and dwindling prestige? (Leadership 
Newspaper quoted in Nigerian-Newspaper.com). 
State governments frequently create new “traditional” thrones. This reflects their continuing interests in 
the traditional political institutions. The Benue State government, for instance, created several new 
second-class chiefs in the state in 1997. Although created in the name of customs and traditions; these 
are brand new institutions that have no precedence in the political experience of the people of Benue 
State. Interestingly, part of the justification for traditional rulership is that it is a mode of governance 
indigenously created by Africans long before the continent was colonized by Europeans. As the action 
of the Benue State in creating new second-class chiefs has shown however, some of these traditional 
rulership institutions have no connection with the pre-colonial political realities of Africa. Thus, in this 
context, tradition is merely invoked in response to modern political exigencies. At the federal level, a 
new institution called the National Council of Traditional Rulers was created; comprising 74 graded 
rulers from all the thirty-six states and the Abuja Capital Territory, it was created to “serve as a 
consultative assembly through which the federal government would feel the pulse of the grassroots 
communities”. Government’s interests in the institution can also be deduced from the fact that most 
state governors have special advisers for chieftaincy affairs (Agbese, 2004). 
In the same vein, military administrators conferred importance on traditional rulers by their 
demonstrated eagerness to pay homage to prominent traditional rulers as soon as they assumed office as 
military governors. Under military rule, it became a tradition that the first place of call for a newly 
appointed military governor to any of the thirty-six states was the palace of the leading traditional ruler 
in the state. Through this open homage to traditional rulers, military governors sought to cloak 
themselves in the legitimacy which the indigenous political institutions are believed to confer on people. 
Traditional rulers on their part would pledge their loyalty and the loyalty of their people, to the new 
regime. In an ironic twist, which is crystal clear indicates that the frequent government intervention in 
chieftaincy affairs reflects the importance which various state governments attach to the institution 
(Agbese, 2004). 
Intuitively, intervention in chieftaincy affairs takes place in form of demotion, deposition, and 
banishment of traditional rulers as a way to punish erring royal fathers who do not do the bidding of the 
government of the day. Sequel to this view, Alhaji Muhammadu Sanusi, the Emir of Kano, Olateru 
Olagbegi, the Olowo of Owo and Ibrahim Dasuki, Sultan of Sokoto are among prominent traditional 
rulers who have been deposed by various state governments and were also banished from their 
kingdoms. In the same vein, during the turbulent era of party politics in the Second Republic, many 
state governors sought wider powers over chieftaincy matters. The Ogun State House of Assembly 
passed a bill giving the state governor such powers. This action however led to several clashes between 
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state governors and traditional rulers. As Afriscopemagazine pointed out: “within the first two years [of 
the Second Republic], almost every state has witnessed conflicts of one form or another between its 
government functionaries and its traditional rulers, leaving a trail of heightened tension in as many as 
eleven states”. Governor Jim Nwobodo of Anambra State expressed his displeasure with the Obi of 
Onitsha, OfalaOkagbue, by dropping him as the state’s representative to the National Council of State. 
Governor Sam Mbakwe of Imo State ordered that the title, “His Royal Highness”, should be dropped 
from the names of traditional rulers in Imo. In Kano, Governor AbubakarRimi issued a query to the 
Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero, alleging that the Emir had engaged in acts of disrespect to the governor’s 
administration. The governor’s query to the Emir precipitated violent mob demonstrations which led to 
the death of the governor’s political adviser, Bala Mohammed. Several government buildings in Kano 
and the homes of some politicians were also burnt during the fracas (Agbese, 2004). 
The post-colonial state has criminalized the factual indigenous structure in Nigeria, these is evident in 
major suspension of traditional rulers as it is also exemplified in the removal of Deji of Akure in South 
Western Nigeria who was alleged of brutally beating his wife as against the courtesy of fundamental 
disposition of traditional ruler as a symbolic personality in the society. In tandem with foregoing, the 
most recent endorsement in the fourth republic of Lamido Sanusi (Former Central Bank Governor) by 
the Kano State Governor as an Emir of Kano generated violence in Kano State signaling how 
post-colonial state influenced the indigenous institution that presumed to revere customs and traditions 
of the society in question. It is believed that the formal institutional structure coordinates and 
determines the existence and recognition of traditional rulership institution which has become the bane 
of indigenous society in Nigeria. The empirical evidence has revealed that during military and civilian 
regimes, countless number of traditional rulers were demoted, suspended or removed by the state. 
2.1.3 Responses from the Field Survey Analyzed 
Amidst all the above-mentioned setbacks, traditional rulers still maintain some democratic roles: broker 
between the people and the state; enhancing national identity; and providing an institutional 
safety-valve for inadequate bureaucracies. Specifically, traditional rulership institutions have been 
acknowledged as veritable instruments for voters’ mobilization and civic education in electoral 
processes. Though, some of the traditional rulers still engross in party politicking, selecting party 
candidacy, and drumming support for party. As reported by Ihemeje (2014), traditional rulers directly or 
indirectly influence the choice of candidacy through advice received from the council of states or 
council of traditional rulers in a state. Furthermore, Ihemeje (2014) expatiated that this view was 
demonstrated at the instances of Adam Oshiomole and IsiakaAjumobi of Action Congress of Nigeria, 
now All Progressive Congress (APC), they emerged as Governors of Edo and Oyo States respectively 
because they were endorsed by traditional rulers and chiefs of their respective states. 
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3. Result/Finding 
Findings from field survey revealed that prominent traditional rulers in Nigeria have been fully 
involved in the Nigerian electoral processes. Ayuba, a high chief from Ilorin Emirate Council (2013 as 
cited in Ihemeje, 2014) noted that traditional rulers have indirect role in electoral process as they are 
been heavily relied on, because they are close to the community, endowed with wisdom drawn from 
tradition and culture in their various domains. It is important to note that human beings are political 
animals so also the traditional rulers, but they however do not own or form political party. What they 
do essentially in electoral process is to engage in enlightenment programs for their subjects before 
elections such as those involving registrations, voting and peace-making. Ayuba (2013 as cited in 
Ihemeje, 2014) further expressed that they also organized meetings with security officials toward a 
hitch-free election exercise. In his statement, Ayuba opined that one may think a good traditional ruler 
should not be a politician rather he should have interest in political party and candidates by taking 
cognizance of their manifestoes. However, their main role is to galvanize and sensitize their subjects to 
participate in elections and ensuring that they are well-behaved during and after elections. This clearly 
indicates that their role cannot be overemphasized as far as the electoral process is concerned in 
Nigeria. 
High Chief OfiliUkpabi, a titled chief and member of the traditional rulers’ council discussed 
extensively on the role of traditional rulers in Nigerian electoral process. As a chief cabinet member of 
IgweNnaemeka Achebe, Obi of Onitsha, Anambra State, he revealed that traditional rulers are very 
instrumental to ensuring development, peace and stability in the country’s political system. Ihemeje 
(2014) noted during the course of interview with the mentioned High Chief that these roles played by 
traditional rulers reflect positively on their impact in the country’s electoral process. For instance, no 
traditional ruler would be satisfied with rigging, thuggery and hooliganism during elections. So, their 
role is very crucial towards the successful conduct of elections. What they do in most cases include 
holding meetings and deliberating how to ensure hitch-free elections with their chiefs and subjects. 
Ukpabi (2012 as cited in Ihemeje, 2014) demonstrated that they give political education to their 
subjects to include those at home and in diaspora. They used the media, town meetings, traditional 
council meetings, and other important avenues to disseminate electoral messages. They do not directly 
get involved in politics however; rather buy into the programs of a given political party. However, the 
role they play in the electoral process is very germane, particularly in the fourth republic. Between 
1999 and 2011, their impacts have been rewarding and even became more unprecedented since 2002, 
being the period that marked the installment of IgweNnaemeka Achebe, Obi of Onitsha in the case of 
Anambra State. Other sister states in the South-east geopolitical zone have also borrowed a great deal 
of proper conduct in the electoral process from his royal highness, IgweNnaemeka Achebe. I mean 
traditional rulers of Imo, Enugu, Abia and Ebonyi States respectively. 
Ladigbolu, a high chief from Oyo traditional ruling council (2013 as cited in Ihemeje, 2014) 
commented on the role of Alaafin of Oyo as a traditional ruler in Nigerian electoral processes. He 
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stressed that the traditional ruler like that of the Alaafin of Oyo performs a pertinent role in the electoral 
process particularly in ensuring that wrong electoral procedures are contested. For instance, Alaafin of 
Oyo does not dabble into electoral disruptions, as it were. As part of the role played by a traditional 
ruler in an electoral process include the acceptance and upholding of the electoral acts, defending the 
course of credible elections, that is to say, one-man-one-vote. The traditional ruler, in his wisdom, also 
ensures that his subjects have periodic and quality political education, before, during and after elections. 
In the view of Ladigbolu, “what weakens electoral process in Nigeria is essentially the introduction of 
human weakness against the electoral laws such as rigging through multiple voting, snatching of ballot 
boxes, thuggery, and electoral violence. And of course, you would agree with me that Oyo State is 
enmeshed with electoral volatility when compared with other states in the country” (Ladigbolu, 2013, 
as cited in Ihemeje, 2014). He believed that the traditional ruler should be amenable to information 
regarding electoral process. To a very large extent, the Alaafin of Oyo had been very supportive in the 
electoral process. 
In Edebiri’s view, a high chief and second in command to the then Oba of Benin observed that the Oba 
of Benin is the traditional head of all the traditional rulers in Edo State and of course, a very strong 
force to reckon with as far as traditional rulership is concerned in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world 
over. He noted: our traditional ruler had never been neutral in matters of electoral process as he had 
been actively involved in different electoral periods which ensured electoral-violence free moments. He 
had at different times advocated for a free and fair level-play ground to various political parties. Our 
traditional ruler periodically used his chiefs to champion effective electoral process in their domains as 
well as localities. As part of his contribution to the electoral process, he equally enlightened subjects in 
different domains on voters’ education and rights. It is on the basis of his contribution and those of the 
chiefs that he is popularly respected (Edebiri, 2012, as cited in Ihemeje, 2014).  
 
4. Discussion 
Inferences can be drawn from the various responses of the eminent high chiefs on behalf of their 
traditional rulers with respect to the subject: traditional rulers, electoral process and Nigeria’s fourth 
republic. Significantly, Chief Ayuba of Ilorin Emirate Council agreed that individual and collective 
responsiveness of traditional rulership institutions to electoral process in Nigeria was borne out of the 
intermediary roles they play in governance, especially between the government and grassroots. He 
added and maintained that such pivotal effort is hitherto practiced since the return to civil rule, 
between1999 and 2011, being democratic periods when elections were held (Ayuba, 2013, in cited 
Ihemeje, 2014). The practice was equally extended to the 2015 elections that brought Mr. 
MuhammaduBuhari to power.  
In view of Archbishop Ladigbolu of Oyo Council of Traditional Rulers and Chiefs, he opined that 
Alaafin as well as most paramount rulers in the country perform such electoral intermediary functions 
due to the fact that they are not just the custodians of indigenous culture, customs and tradition, but also 
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serve as watchdogs for the people. And as such, they have so much to offer and gain when their 
electoral roles are effectively and efficiently carried out. On the issue of neutrality or anonymity, 
virtually all the traditional rulers could be seen not to be partisan politicians (Ladigbolu, 2013, as cited 
in Ihemeje, 2014). To them, they got involved in matters that bothered on sensitizing, galvanizing and 
disseminating political education to their subjects for elections, where their impacts were directly seen 
and felt. 
Remarkably, Chief Ukpabi of Anambra State Council of Traditional Rulers and Chiefs, in his 
assessment on “neutrality” and condition that necessitate such, he said that neutrality could not yield 
any positive result for the community because when traditional rulers were passive in participating in 
electoral process, electorates might not believe and participate in elections, as community and 
infrastructural development would be low. Clarifying further, he noted that people should not term such 
role played by traditional rulers in the electoral process as being actively involved in politics, they 
perform such roles simply because the constitution and electoral laws permit them to do so (Ukpabi, 
2012, as cited in Ihemeje, 2014).  
Corroboratively, Chief Edebiri of Edo State Council of Traditional Rulers and Chiefs opined that “no 
traditional ruler was allowed to play politics as stipulated by the constitution of Nigeria, but people 
usually misconstrued the electoral functions with active politics”. To him, they are different in the sense 
that the role played by monarchs in electoral process does not necessarily accord them partisan 
politicians rather; they perform such role so as to reach out to their subjects. Although, he added that a 
traditional ruler may decide not to partake in electoral process, if he so wishes. On the other hand, 
neutrality could mean not belonging or supporting any political party and which of course, is not 
publicly pronounced but perceived (Edebiri, 2012, as cited in Ihemeje, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
respondent showered encomia on traditional rulership institution for their contributions in the electoral 
process in Nigeria since 1999; hence seen as source of support to the modern governance system. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The pivotal role of galvanizing and sensitizing citizens in various domains by traditional rulers prior to, 
and during electioneering periods in Nigeria’s fourth republic are well recognized; which is however 
translated to the nature of co-operation enjoyed among electoral officials and the government. However, 
this paper argues that mix of conspiracy, corruption, dictatorship between incumbent political leaders 
and traditional rulers exist; yet, it remains inevitable to alienate the institution of traditional rulers from 
the electoral process due to their place, role and contributions in the larger political landscape of the 
country. Keeping in mind that, politics is culture-bound; the paper therefore identifies the potency of 
continuous systematic integration of traditional rulers in the nation’s electoral process and recommends 
their harmonious relationship with the electoral commissions, the press, the political party, civil society 
organizations, and the electorate, as it will continue to enhance their relevance in Nigeria’s electoral 
process, and in tandem with their fatherly roles as custodians of people, culture, custom and traditions 
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which of course, translates to political maturity they often portray in deepening democratic governance.  
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